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Abstract
Research on the effect of face-orientation on scalar implicatures has claimed that
face-threatening contexts are one type of context in which scalar implicatures are not
warranted. However, that research has been based on the two staples of scalar impli-
cature research, some and or. Given research on scalar diversity has shown that these
terms are rather exceptional in inducing high rates of scalar implicatures, we believe it
is time for a reassessment. We explored the relationship between scalar implicatures
and face concerns by means of an experiment involving eight types of scalar terms in
face-boosting and face-threatening contexts. While our results showed that some and
or reliably tended to induce scalar implicatures in both types of contexts, confirming
the findings of scalar diversity research in this respect, we failed to replicate previous
findings that face-threatening contexts do not induce scalar implicatures. We discuss
reasons for these findings and how face concerns should be implemented for future
experimentation in this vein.
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1 Introduction
The recent experimental turn in linguistic pragmatics (Noveck&Reboul, 2008)
has injectednew life into debates that hadpreviously beenwaged almost exclu-
sively on theoretical grounds.One suchdebate concerns theboundarybetween
semantics and pragmatics; namely, what part of listeners’ interpretation of a
speaker’s utterance is contributed by their knowledge of the language andwhat
part is guided by contextual assumptions based on the surrounding discourse
or extra-linguistic factors. Default accounts (e.g., Levinson, 2000) emphasise
the importance of the speaker’s choice of words, which justifies drawing con-
clusions listeners may later need to retract if they turn out to be unwarranted
in the context at hand. Contextualist accounts (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1986),
on the other hand, deny the existence of such a priori interpretations, arguing
instead that listeners begin enriching linguistic representations with contex-
tual information from the start. Finally, constraint-based accounts (e.g., Degen
& Tanenhaus, 2015) relativise defaults to contextual conditions and attempt to
identify the parameters that constrain their generation. Although the correct-
ness of one of these accounts over the others remains to be proven, the phe-
nomenonof scalar implicature has provided fertile grounds for testing their rel-
ativemerits. The present article contributes to this literature by experimentally
investigating the interpretation of a variety of scalar terms in face-boosting vs.
face-threatening contexts and using the results to expand on previous findings
in this regard.
Scalar implicatures (henceforth SIs) are a type of inference in which the use
of an informationallyweaker term(e.g., some) is taken tomean that an informa-
tionally stronger term (e.g.,all) does not apply.1 For a real-life example, consider
(1) below:
(1) “Consumers claim some Samsung washing machines explode.” (http://
abc13.com/technology/consumers‑claim‑some‑samsung‑washing‑machi
nes‑explode/1058097/; retrieved 26/7/2017)2
1 Geurts (2010: 31) defines SIs as a subset of a more general category of quantity implicatures,
inwhich the pertinent question is notwhy the speaker did not say (in a relevant sense of ‘say’)
the stronger proposition but whether the speaker believes the stronger proposition to be true
(2010: 3). Since for a politenessmotive to be plausible, the “competence assumption” (Geurts,
2010: 29)must hold—the listener thinks the speaker knowswhether the stronger proposition
is true but is not saying so out of politeness—cases where the speaker is thought not to know
which of the twomeanings is true are excluded from consideration. In other words, the phe-
nomena discussed in this article belong to Geurts’ “scalar” subset, which is why we continue
to use the term ‘SI’ throughout.
2 Following Levinson (1995: 110, fn. 3), we indicate utterances in double quotation marks and
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In their response to this complaint, Samsung asserted that the four con-
sumers interviewed “each have different washingmachinemodels [… and that
…] [w]hile unfortunate, their experiences are very rare when compared to
the number of washing machines we sell each year” (ibid.). This suggests that
they interpreted (1) in a two-sided3 way as ‘some but not all Samsung washing
machines explode,’4 although (1) would be no less true if it turned out that all
Samsung washing machines did (if they all explode, then necessarily some of
them do). In other words, the inference from “some x” to ‘some but not all x’
can be cancelled (or does not always arise, depending on the framework one
adopts).
This article brings together two lines of work on SIs. The first stems from
studies of an expanded range of scalar terms (Doran et al., 2009; Van Tiel et al.,
2016, among others), beyond the now classical pairs ⟨some, all⟩ and ⟨or, and⟩
investigated in much of the related literature. These studies found significant
variability in the extent to which different scalar terms are likely to induce a
SI, a phenomenon described as “scalar diversity” by Van Tiel et al. (2016). In
this line of work, scalar diversity is understood as a property of scalar terms
independent of their situational context of utterance. The factors explored for
their impact on the likelihood of a two-sided reading are (lexical semantic)
properties of the scalar term. This is true also of more recently proposed fac-
tors, such as upper-bound excluded local enrichment (UBELE, Sun et al., 2018)
and whether the stronger alternative instantiates the critical bound (Simons &
Warren, 2018), put forward as additional dimensions along which scalar terms
differ.
A second line of work has investigated how situational context affects the
likelihood of SI derivation. This work has revealed an interesting relationship
between SIs and interpersonal factors such as face (Brown&Levinson, 1987). In
a series of experiments, Bonnefon and colleagues found that a scalar term like
“some” is significantly less likely to be interpreted as ‘some but not all’ if the lis-
tener attributes a polite (i.e., face-saving) intention to the speaker (Bonnefon
& Villejoubert, 2006; Bonnefon, Feeney & Villejoubert, 2009; Feeney & Bon-
implicatures, which are not spoken out loud, in single ones.We use the +> symbol to indicate
a conversational implicature.
3 Other terms used in the literature for what, following Horn (1992), we are calling ‘two-sided’
vs. ‘one-sided’ readings include ‘narrowed’ vs. ‘broadened’ (Bonnefon et al., 2009), ‘upper-
bounding’ vs. ‘lower-bounding’ (Breheny et al., 2005) and ‘pragmatic’ vs. ‘semantic’ (Holt-
graves & Kraus, 2018).
4 This interpretation assures us that the SI was derived in this case (at least by the company’s
representatives), despite the fact that it is embedded. For a summary of issues surrounding
embedded implicatures, see Chemla & Singh, 2014a, b.
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nefon, 2012; Bonnefon, Dahl & Holtgraves, 2015). Based on these results, they
concluded that face-threatening contexts are one type of context in which SIs
are not warranted.
We address the following research questions: (1) How are scalar terms inter-
preted when embedded in face-threatening vs. face-boosting contexts? (2) Do
different scalar terms behave alike in this respect or is there variation among
them?We present an experiment designed to answer these questions and dis-
cuss our findings in light of previouswork. Ourwork differs frommost previous
work on scalar diversity in that we considered utterances embedded in short
story contexts rather than in isolation, since we are precisely interested in the
impact of situational context on scalar diversity. It also differs from previous
work on the impact of face on SIs in that we argue for a different, contextually-
motivated, construal of face-boost and face-threat.We also define and theoret-
ically motivate face-boost, which remains under-theorized in previous work.
We open with an overview of previous research on these topics (section 2), fol-
lowed by a discussion of some problematic aspects that serves to clarify how
we defined important theoretical notions and why (section 3). In section 4, we
describe the experiment and analyse our results. Section 5 discusses their sig-
nificance and limitations, while section 6 provides some concluding thoughts.
2 Putting scalar diversity in context
2.1 Previous work on scalar diversity
Building on Doran et al. (2009), Van Tiel et al. (2016) tested 43 scalar terms
representing five types of scales (2 quantifiers, 1 adverb, 2 auxiliary verbs, 6
main verbs, and 32 adjectives) and found significant variability in the extent
to which they induced SIs, both in neutral (SI-rates range: 100% to 4%) and
non-neutral (SI-rates range: 93% to 4%) sentential contexts.5 To explain this
variability, they explored a number of factors including association strength
between scalar alternatives (implemented as the ease with which a weaker
term calls up a stronger alternative), their grammatical class (open vs. closed),
5 In their neutral contexts, they used pronominal subjects (example: “John says: She is intelli-
gent. Would you conclude from this that, according to John, she is not brilliant?”), while in
their non-neutral ones the subject was a full NP (example: “John says: This student is intelli-
gent. Would you conclude from this that, according to John, she is not brilliant?”). Of course,
the extent to which any sentential context can be considered neutral (e.g., free of stereotyp-
ical assumptions about gender and about why ‘John’ would say that about ‘her’) is an open
question.
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relative (between scalar alternatives) or absolute word frequencies, semantic
relatedness (the extent to which they share collocates in a corpus), semantic
distance (the size of the interval between themon the scale), and boundedness
(whether the dimension over which the scalar terms quantify has a specifiable,
lexicalized endpoint). Of these, only the last two turned out to explain some
of the variance in SI rates; yet, even the strongest predictor, boundedness, only
explained 10%of the variance.Another 30%wasdue to itemsandparticipants,
while a full 48% remained unexplained. As a tentative explanation for this the
authors surmise that statistical tendencies in languagemay inform participant
judgements in ways that cannot be predicted by attributes of the scalars them-
selves. Thus, while having established the reality of scalar diversity, this study
was unable to identify its main source(s).
Following in Van Tiel et al.’s footsteps, Sun et al. (2018) conducted further
experiments that confirmed the earlier findings. Using the samematerials and
two new tests, theywere able to identify UBELE as an additional factor explain-
ing some of the variance inVanTiel et al.’s (2016) results. UBELE is ameasure of
the propensity of scalar terms to receive a two-sided reading prior to consider-
ing the sentential context. Having found that scalar terms differ in this regard,
Sun et al. go on to interpret their findings as evidence for a dual route account,
in which scalar terms may be locally or globally enriched. Standard Gricean
inference based on alternatives corresponds to global enrichment, while local
enrichment is the result of Bayesian reasoning based on the prior probability
that a termwill receive a two-sided or a one-sided reading. Local enrichment is
an interesting notion: first, it can go either way (scalar termsmay have a prefer-
ence for two-sided readings—UBELE—or for one-sided readings; that is, it can
track genuine underspecification w.r.t. these two ‘literal’ meanings of a scalar
rather than taking the one-sided reading as the encoded one that goes through
in case the SI is defeated/not generated); and second, since it does not rely
on alternatives, it is not vulnerable to scale availability and how experimental
tasks may affect this (cf. McNally 2017). UBELE is of course itself something to
be explained: what determines the prior probability that a scalar will be inter-
preted in a two-sided or one-sided way? Sun et al. do not raise this question;
however, one hypothesis is that stylistic and other properties of the scalar (reg-
ister, dialect, etc.) may interact with societal norms regarding expected uses to
generate the prior probabilities reflected—as far as two-sided readings go—in
UBELE.
This possibility seems worth exploring in light of recent work on negative
strengthening (Benz et al., 2018; Gotzner et al., 2018). Negative strengthening
occurs when the negation of a stronger term is taken to imply that a weaker
term is alsonot applicable (e.g.,when “not brilliant” is interpreted as ‘not intelli-
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gent’).This amounts to informational strengtheningof “not brilliant” to exclude
‘intelligent’, a possibility left open by scalar reasoning. The relevant reasoning
has been described as blocking, or an application of Horn’s (1984) R-principle
(inference to the stereotype), which may be attributed to a politeness motiva-
tion: a boss who is “not happy” with an employee’s performance may well be
implicating that she is ‘not content’ with it while tempering the negativity of
her remark. Benz et al. (2018) found that adjectivesmore likely to be negatively
strengthened were less likely to be interpreted in a two-sided way in Van Tiel
et al.’s (2016) results; in other words, they found a negative correlation between
negative strengthening and SI-rate derivation.Gotzner et al. (2018) investigated
the structure of the corresponding adjectival scales and added vagueness (no
context-independent standards) and adjectival extremeness to the list of fac-
tors affecting the likelihood of a two-sided reading.
The importance of adjectival extremeness was confirmed in another study
by Simons & Warren (2018), who found that “the critical factor may not sim-
ply be the boundedness of the underlying scale, but that the stronger alter-
native instantiates the critical bound” (2018: 277). Simons & Warren’s study is
also methodologically interesting, in that, unlike the studies reported so far,
which relied on assessments of individual utterances via direct probing, they
assessed the interpretation of each scalar adjective inmultiple rich contexts in
which three scalarswere embedded at a time, and askedparticipants to provide
consistency ratings for statements corresponding to different interpretations
of each scalar that did not explicitly mention stronger scalemates. They were
thus able to show that the scalar diversity effects found in previous studies can
also be obtained through more natural, indirect elicitation tasks, eliminating
some of the criticisms directed at the earlier studies (e.g., by McNally, 2017)
and demonstrating the robustness of the relevant phenomena.
These experimental studies have made significant inroads into understand-
ing the nature of scalar diversity, especially in the adjectival domain. Their
results converge in several ways, notably the greater likelihood of two-sided
readings for ‘logical’ terms such as some and or as opposed to more evalua-
tive and vague ones, and the importance of boundedness as a semantic factor
favouring two-sided interpretations. Yet, what has so far remained unexplored
is the input of situational context in this process. Van Tiel at al. (2016: 142)
explicitly argue against the inclusion of narrative contexts, as these vary in
wordiness among others, seeing it as a weakness of Doran et al.’s (2009) study.
However, McNally (2017) has pointed out that at least some scalar terms (espe-
cially adjectives) may not have fixed meanings outside of specific contexts
of use and it is only under such circumstances that they can be candidates
for scalar enrichment (when the alternatives are made clear). The upshot of
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her discussion is that formal semantics/pragmatics cannot continue to ignore
parameters of the context that feed into the interpretation of scalars and there-
fore also into experimental subjects’ considerations when carrying out exper-
imental tasks. In support of her view, Simons &Warren’s (2018) study showed
that scalar diversity effects also obtain in richer contexts. Going forward, there
are some good reasons to expect that situational context may constitute an
additional factor interacting with sentence context and the semantics of the
scalar to produce the observed rates of SI derivation. The next section provides
a critical overview of this research.
2.2 Previous work on SIs and face
Studies that have investigated the impact of situational context on SIs have
focused on face-threatening vs. face-boosting contexts. Adopting the notion of
“face” from Brown and Levinson’s work on politeness (1987), where it refers to
“the public self-image that [every rational communicator] wants to claim for
himself” (1987: 61), researchers have argued that utterances of the type “Some
X-ed” are face-boosting if the semantic content of the predicate X is favourable
to the listener, but face-threatening when X expresses something unfavourable
for the listener. In one set of experiments, Bonnefon et al. (2009) investigated
contrasting pairs of utterances such as (2) and (3) below.
(2) Some people loved your poem.
(3) Some people hated your poem.
They presented participants with a scenario inwhich one of these utterances is
confided to the author of a poem that was discussed at a poetry groupmeeting
he was unable to attend by another group member. After reading the scenario
followed by one of the two utterances, participants answered the following
Yes/No question:
(4) ‘From what this fellow member told you, do you think it is possible that
everyone loved [hated] your poem?’
They found that participantswere inclined to interpret (2) two-sidedly as ‘some
but not all people loved your poem’, but they were significantly less inclined to
do the same in the case of (3) (they interpreted (3) as ‘some and possibly all
people hated your poem’).
Bonnefon andhis colleagues attributed these results to the different face ori-
entations of the two utterances. Specifically, they argue that in the case of (3),
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but not (2), the speaker is likely to want to mitigate the unpleasantness of her
message out of consideration for the listener. She may, then, say “Some people
hated your poem,” fully knowing that all of them did. Aware of this possibility,
the listener may in turn not be fooled by her choice of words and suspect that
all of those present hated his poem—all thewhile being grateful to her for soft-
ening the blow. Feeney and Bonnefon (2012) replicated these results with the
logical connective or, and went on to interpret their findings as indicating that
face-threatening contexts favour one-sided interpretations of scalar terms (i.e.,
interpreting “some” as ‘some and possibly all’).
More recent studies have studied the impact of face-threat on the deriva-
tion of SIs using onlinemeasures. In one study using ERPs, Holtgraves & Kraus
(2018) examined five scalar expressions (some, sometimes, like, good, and prob-
able) embedded in conversational contexts under face-threatening and non-
face-threatening conditions. Participants read short scenarios followed by a
target utterance containing the scalar in the first half of the utterance (e.g.,
some) and a two-sided (e.g., not all) or one-sided (e.g., all) continuation in its
second half, as in (5):
(5) John couldn’tmake it to Susan’s party. Tomakeup for it, hemadeher some
cookies andbrought themover for theparty. After thepartywas over, John
asked Susan if any of his cookies were left over. Susan says:
There were some left over, specifically, they were not all left over. (two-
sided)
There were some left over, specifically, they were all left over. (one-sided)
In the face-threatening condition, the recipient of Susan’s utterance was John,
i.e. the person who had baked the cookies and whose face could therefore be
threatened by an assertion that all of his cookies were left over. In the non-
face-threatening condition, the recipient of Susan’s utterancewas a third party,
whose face was assumed to be unaffected by the content of her utterance. Neu-
ral responses to the screen containing the scalar term (“some left over”) did
not vary between the two conditions. However, neural responses to the one-
sided continuation (time-locked to the screen “all left over”) resulted in a larger
P300 component compared with the two-sided continuation (time-locked to
the screen “not all left over”), and this differencewas greaterwhen the situation
was face-threatening. Additionally, larger P200 responses6 were observed for
6 P200 is generally considered an early attention-related ERP component, indexing fast, auto-
matic detection of emotionally salient stimuli. It tends to be more pronounced for negative
material (Carretie et al., 2001; Delplancque et al., 2004).
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the positively valenced terms (good and like) in the face-threatening condition
(2018: 99), leading the authors surmise that “situations which invoke polite-
ness are more emotionally salient than situations where the probability of
offending someone is low” (2018: 102). We return to this finding in section 5
below.
According toHoltgraves&Kraus, this pattern suggests that in conversational
contexts in general, it is the two-sided interpretation that is expected. In other
words, SIs are generated upon encountering the scalar term, especially when
the situation is face-threatening, and that is what is causing the larger P300
indicating an updating of the context when the one-sided continuation is sub-
sequently encountered. Conversely, in non-face-threatening contexts, the P300
effect on the continuation is smaller, suggesting that the one-sided reading is
less unexpected in these contexts.
With respect to these results, one might note that the one-sided continua-
tion (“they were all left over”) in the second part of the utterance in the face-
threatening contexts constitutes an (additional) on-record face-threat (rather
than itsmitigation).Thismayhave ledparticipants towonderwhy Susanwould
say this to John’s face, when she could have stopped after the first part of her
utterance and merely implicated it—other than to hurt his feelings. If so, the
larger P300 effect observed in these contexts could well be indicating partici-
pants’ surprise at Susan’s behaviour (their updating the context with informa-
tion abouther face-threatening intention), rather thanat theone-sided reading
per se (their updating the context with information about the meaning of the
scalar). Unfortunately, the experimental setup of this study does not allow us
to distinguish between these two possibilities.
At first sight, these results are opposed to those of Bonnefon and his col-
leagues but another recent study using response times (Mazzarella et al., 2018)
suggests how they could be made compatible. Replicating the methodology
followed by Bonnefon and his colleagues and positing that the prevalence of
one-sided readings in their studies was due to a failure to distinguish between
(initial) comprehensionof the SI and its (subsequent) acceptance, they divided
the experimental task into two parts and elicited subjects’ responses as well as
reaction times to two different questions. After presenting participants with
speech vignettes defined as face-threatening or face-boosting depending on
the predicate used, as in (6):
(6) a. Imagine you gave a speech at a small political meeting. You are dis-
cussing your speech with Denise, who was also there. There were 6
other people in the audience that day. You tell Denise that you are
thinking about giving the same speech to another group.
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b. Hearing this, Denise tells you that “Some people hated [loved] your
speech.”
they asked them to respond to the following two questions in sequence:
(6) c. Given what Denise told you, do you think that it is possible that every-
body hated [loved] your speech? (the “semantic compatibility” ques-
tion)
d. Given what Denise tells you, do you think that she means that you
should give the speech again to another group? (the “conversational
implicature” question)
The researchers’ goalwas to tap into participants’ interpretation of the scalar in
the two face conditions (their answers to 6c) separately from their assessment
of the speaker’s communicative intention (their answers to 6d). They alsomea-
sured response times to the reading of the utterance containing the scalar (6b)
and, separately, to answering the question in (6c).
What they foundwas that in face-threatening contexts (“Some people hated
your speech”), participants overwhelmingly agreed about the speaker’s com-
municative intention (93% thought Denise means that you should not give
the speech again) and that their interpretation of the scalar (45% YES to the
semantic compatibility question and 55% NO) played no evident part in that.
Conversely, in face-boosting contexts (“Some people loved your speech”), par-
ticipants were split regarding the speaker’s communicative intention: 64%
thoughtDenisemeans you should give the speechagainwhile 36%thought she
means that you should not; crucially, these answerswere interrelatedwith their
interpretation of the scalar. In particular, of those who interpreted the scalar in
a one-sided way (‘some and possibly all loved …’), 87.5% also thought Denise
means you should give the speech again, while for those who interpreted it in
a two-sided way (‘some but not all loved …’) this percentage fell to just above
half (53%).
What these results suggest, as the authors themselves are quick to acknowl-
edge, is that “the negative valence of the verb “hate” may be stronger than the
positive valence of the verb “love”” (2018: 5). In fact, as we discuss in the next
section, positively valenced words are not always face-boosting.While for neg-
atively valenced words (“hated”) the negative affect encoded in the predicate
may be enough to render their use face-threatening, for positively valenced
words (“loved”), the face-boost or -threatmaywell lie not somuch in the predi-
cate itself but in what the speaker is thereby implicating (a positive or negative
answer to the conversational implicature question). This inherent asymmetry
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makes it likely that both Bonnefon et al.’s and Mazzarella et al.’s results tell us
more about the processing of some in the scope of negatively and positively
valenced predicates than about the effect of face-threat/boost as such.
3 Rationale for the present study
3.1 How should face-threat be construed?
In Bonnefon et al.’s (2009) and Mazzarella et al.’s (2018) experiments, an utter-
ance such as (2) was defined as face-boosting based on the fact that what is sig-
nified by the positively-valenced predicate “loved” does not threaten the face of
the listener,whilewhat is signified by thenegatively-valencedpredicate “hated”
does, making an utterance such as (3) face-threatening. In other words, when
the speaker wishes to avoid face-threat (making politeness a relevant consid-
eration for the listener), the context was deemed to be face-threatening, while
when there is no reason to suspect the speaker is trying to save the listener’s
face, the context was deemed to be face-boosting.7,8
However, an utterance such as (2) (“Some people loved your poem”) can also
be face-threatening, in the sense that it can be used to avoid face-threat. For
instance, by indicating that ‘not everyone loved your poem’ it may be covertly
communicating something unfavourable for the addressee; or, it may be used
to veil the speaker’s owndislike of the listener’s poem (‘Somepeople, of whom I
wasn’t one, loved your poem’). A number of factors could lead to this two-sided
interpretation of (2), including the alternatives available in the discourse con-
text (e.g., “everyone” would be a relevant response if it were mutually known
that a unanimous vote was needed for the poem to win a prize in a poetry
competition, or if (2) were uttered in reply to the question “Did people like my
poem?”) and the intonational contour of the utterance (whether the quantifier
“some” or the predicate “loved” is accented).
The possibility of construing (2) as face-threatening along these lines could
be seen as an instance of what is known in psychology as ‘negativity bias,’
7 Bonnefon et al.’s (2009) second experiment aimed precisely at disentangling the effects of
impact on the listener’s face from the effects of simply using a (positively or negatively)
evaluative term (“loved” vs. “hated”) without impacting the listener’s face. However, even
in this experiment, the story as well as the rest of the utterance context around the scalar
term remain exactly the same across the two conditions (face-boosting vs. face-threatening),
meaning that, when impact on face is expected, determining the direction of impact (boost
or threat) essentially comes down to the lexical semantics of the predicate used.
8 Mazzarella et al. (2018) adopt this understanding of face-threatening vs. face-boosting, while
Holtgraves & Kraus (2018) opt for the more accurate “non-face-threatening” for the latter.
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that is, people’s tendency to attach greater importance to negatively-valenced
events over positively-valenced ones, which can be explained on evolution-
ary grounds (Baumeister et al. 2001: 358). Closely related to this is the ‘severity
effect’ observed in experimental politeness research, according to which peo-
ple tend to overestimate the likelihood of negative eventualities (Bonnefon &
Villejoubert, 2006; see also Holtgraves & Bonnefon, 2017: 390–391 and the ref-
erences therein). In other words, given two possible readings of an utterance,
people tend to opt for the one with the more negative consequences (see also
Holtgraves, 2014).
What is less commonly observed is that this same severity effect can also
obtain in the case of positively phrased remarks such as (2) (“Some people
loved your poem”). In a now classic article, Boucher & Osgood argued, on
the basis of a sample of 13 languages, for “a universal human tendency to use
evaluatively positive (E+) words more frequently … than evaluatively negative
words (E-)” (1969: 1), a finding they called the Pollyanna hypothesis. This find-
ing is actually not opposed to the severity effect but may even be explained
by it. Faced with the task of letting someone know a not-so-pleasant truth,
speakers choose to put a positive twist on things counting on their interlocu-
tor’s inferential abilities to figure out the bitter truth. Such uses are not only
kinder on the hearer but also easier for the speaker, who might thereby avoid
a certain unpleasantness that would otherwise accrue.9 Recent experimental
results that positive terms like happy are more likely to be negatively strength-
ened (interpreted as excluding weaker alternatives when negated) than their
negative counterparts (Ruytenbeek et al., 2017) confirm listeners’ awareness
of the attested over-use of positively evaluative words (the “sugar coating”
effect of Holtgraves & Bonnefon, 2017: 391), providing cognitive grounds for the
behavioural asymmetry in the use of positively vs. negatively evaluative terms
noted by Boucher & Osgood half a century ago.
To return to the examples in (2) and (3), not only the one-sided interpreta-
tion of some (= … possibly all) in “Some people hated your poem” but also its
two-sided interpretation (= … but not all) in “Some people loved your poem”
can be explained by the same tendency of interlocutors to interpret incom-
ing utterances in a negative, rather than positive, light. Such an overarching
tendency could well override any face-boosting potential encoded into the
utterance via the lexical semantics of the positively-valenced predicate “loved.”
Consequently, the two-sided interpretation of some in (2) (= ‘Some but not
9 We thank Larry Horn for this timely reminder of the interconnectedness of speaker’s and
hearer’s face concerns.
Downloaded from Brill.com03/19/2020 08:09:11AM
via free access
different scalar terms are affected by face differently 13
International Review of Pragmatics 12 (2020) 1–43
all people loved your poem’) observed by Bonnefon et al. (2009) could be
derived on the strength of the same face-saving intention claimed to motivate
its one-sided interpretation in (3) (= ‘Some and possibly all people hated your
poem’). This alternative account calls into question the association between
face-threatening contexts and one-sided interpretations claimed by Bonnefon
et al. (2009). If what were deemed to be face-boosting contexts can be re-
analysed as face-threatening ones (a point we take up in section 3.2), then no
unique association between face-threatening contexts and one-sided interpre-
tations can be claimed. Rather, face-threatening contexts can lead to both two-
sided and one-sided interpretations and both types of interpretation incorpo-
rate face concerns.
The difficulty with deciding whether (2) should be construed as face-boost-
ing or face-threatening points to a larger problem with the way the notion
of face-threat was experimentally implemented in earlier work. Brown and
Levinson (1987: 1) construe face-threat as a non-linguistic perlocutionary effect
that would occur had the speaker not taken linguistic measures (one of their
politeness strategies) to pre-empt it, and suggest three sociological variables
(Distance, Power, and Ranking of the imposition) which are jointly computed
to estimate the risk of face loss (that subsequently drives the choice between
strategies). These three sociological variables are extra-linguistic variables that
depend on the relationship between interlocutors and the culture at hand
(1987: 76). Research since Brown and Levinson concurs that whether an utter-
ance constitutes a threat to the speaker’s or the hearer’s face (or indeed to
both; see above and Turner, 1996) and to what extent depends on many fac-
tors, including the relationship and prior interactional history between inter-
locutors and the sequential ordering of the utterance in the flow of events
(for a recent overview, see O’Driscoll, 2017). Reading the face-threat engen-
dered by “SomeX-ed” off of the lexical semantics of predicateXunderestimates
the extent to which estimations of face-threat are susceptible to context and
vary across situations and cultures. The alternative construal of (2) as face-
threatening proposed above suggests that face-boost and face-threat cannot be
assessed on the basis of lexical semantics alone but rather emerge out of the
interaction between the utterance’s encoded content and its situational con-
text of use. More generally, face concerns are omnipresent: they do not enter
the picture only when something bad is literally said.
3.2 How to conceptualise face-boost?
Another major difficulty with interpreting the results of earlier studies stems
from the fact that face-boost is not a possibility in the framework of Brown
& Levinson in which these studies are couched. In Brown & Levinson’s work,
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face consists of two related aspects, a drive for autonomy (“negative face”) and a
drive for affiliation (“positive face”) and all speech acts are intrinsically threat-
ening to one of these two aspects of either the speaker’s or the hearer’s face
(1987: 65–68). In other words, in the Brown Levinsonian framework, all that
language can do is mitigate the degree of face-threat intrinsically present in
all speech acts, leading critics to highlight the remedial role of politeness in
that framework. There is no indication in that framework that speech acts can
genuinely boost face when there is no need for redress and of the linguistic
strategies that can be used to do that.10 This has been extensively commented
on in the literature since the publication of their essay and prompted several
revisions.11
The fact that, in the Brown Levinsonian framework, all acts are intrinsically
face-threatening but cannot be genuinely face-boosting leaves us at a loss as to
how to conceptualise face-boost in that framework. In Bonnefon et al.’s work,
the term “face-boosting” (2009: 3) is applied to utterances such as (2), where
no face-saving intention is attributed to the speaker (the speaker makes no
attempt to avoid face-threat because no face-threat is assumed to be present
in the context to begin with). Yet, in section 3.1, we showed that even those
instances can be re-analysed as involving a potential threat to face and the
wish to disarm it. A more elegant solution to this problem can be obtained if
we pay attention to a little-noticed asymmetry between positive and negative
face. The next section outlines this asymmetry and builds on it to propose a
possible solution.
3.3 Positive and negative face and the asymmetry between them
As alreadymentioned, in Brown&Levinson’s work, face consists of two related
aspects, a drive for autonomy (“negative face”) and a drive for affiliation (“posi-
tive face”). An important asymmetry exists between these twoaspects: negative
face can only be constituted by avoiding imposition, i.e. by not performing
some (verbal) action, while positive face can be constituted both by perform-
ing some action (e.g., showing approval, face-boosting) and by not perform-
10 Recall that in Brown & Levinson’s framework, positive politeness which does involve face
enhancement is also used to redress a threat. Unlike Brown and Levinson, Robin Lakoff ’s
earlier paper (1973) did allow for acts directly boosting camaraderie under her Rule 3
politeness: “Be friendly”. We thank Larry Horn for reminding us of this.
11 Early examples include Bayraktaroğlu’s (1991) notion of Face-Boosting Acts and Kerbrat-
Orecchioni’s (1997) notion of Face-Enhancing Acts, while Leech’s (2014) notion of pos-
politeness is amore recent attempt in the samedirection. Extensiveworkon face-boosting
acts has been carried out in Spanish-speaking contexts, for an early attempt see Hernan-
dez Flores (1999).
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ing a different type of action (e.g., withholding criticism, face-saving). That is
because on any understanding of negative face that defines it as freedom from
imposition, interaction itself is a kind of imposition (minimally, an imposition
on the listener’s attention and cognitive resources to process what the speaker
is saying). On this count, it is not rationally possible to constitute negative face
except by avoiding interaction, since interaction is itself a kind of imposition.
This also justifieswhy in theirmodel BrownandLevinsonhave included silence
(avoidance of verbal behavior) as themost polite strategy (to be usedwhen the
estimated threat to face is highest). If we take this (strict) Brown & Levinso-
nian line, then it follows that negative face can only be constituted by avoiding
threatening it (i.e. by mitigating behavior which imposes on it or by avoiding
interaction altogether), while positive face can be constituted both by avoid-
ing threatening it (e.g., avoiding criticism) and by directly enhancing it (e.g.,
showing approval).
All of the stories tested in the earlier studies, as well as in our own (see
section 4), involve the listener’s positive face.12 This is in line with Bonnefon
and colleagues’ definition of face as “a sense of positive identity and public
self-esteem that all humans project and are motivated to support in social
interactions” (2009: 250; emphasis added), which corresponds to Brown and
Levinson’s definition of positive face. Indeed, going back over their experimen-
tal materials, one finds that what they termed face-threatening contexts are
precisely those inwhich the speakerworks to pre-empt a possible threat to pos-
itive face (in this sense, a more appropriate term for these contexts might have
been ‘face-saving’), whereas their face-boosting contexts are those in which no
threat to face is assumed to be present to begin with. Others (e.g., Holtgraves
& Kraus, 2018) have opted for the term “non-face-threatening” to describe the
latter. However, this alternative term goes against the widely held view that
“[p]oliteness, […] is not a sometime thing” (Fraser 1990: 233)—or, in Scollon
and Scollon’s words, “there is no face-less communication” (1995: 38).
Adopting Scollon & Scollon’s view, we opt for a different solution. Specif-
ically, we regard as ‘face-boosting’ those contexts in which the speaker’s act
enhances the hearer’s positive face (e.g., by expressing affiliation, solidarity,
approval or admiration for the hearer), while we reserve the term ‘face-
threatening’ for those contexts in which the speaker’s act threatens the hearer’s
positive face (e.g., by not withholding criticism or bad news). While our
12 The following stories from our main study additionally involve avoiding threat to the
speaker’s or the hearer’s negative face: Some-subject story 3, Some-object story 3, Or sto-
ries 2 and 3, Often story 4, and Possible stories 2 and 3.
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definition of face-boosting contexts has no counterpart in Brown and Levin-
son’s work, our definition of face-threatening contexts is in line with their con-
strual of face-threat as related toGoffman’s notionof virtual offence.Theywrite
in this regard:
politeness, like formal diplomatic protocol … presupposes that potential
for aggression as it seeks to disarm it, andmakes possible communication
between potentially aggressive parties. But how?Goffman suggests that it
is through the diplomatic fiction of the virtual offence, or ‘worst possible
reading’ of some action by A that potentially trespasses on B’s interests,
equanimity or personal preserve. By orienting to the ‘virtual offence’, an
offender can display that he has the other’s interests at heart.
Brown and Levinson, 1987: 1; emphasis added
In other words, an act must first engender a potential for face-threat in order
for its linguistic clothing to have a role to play in mitigating that threat. That
is why the degree of face-threat inherent in an act is estimated by aggregat-
ing the values of Distance and Power between interlocutors and Ranking of
the imposition—three extra-linguistic variables—before that act is cast lin-
guistically in terms of one of their politeness strategies able to proportionately
redress that threat. The experimental scenarios we term face-threatening/-
boosting in our study aimed precisely to set up this potential for face-threat/-
boost before the target utterance is uttered, to allow us to observe how scalar
terms are interpreted in those circumstances.13 Our choice to implement face-
boost vs. face-threat with respect to the two possibilities available for positive
face (enhancement and threat) achieves greater symmetry between the two
types of contexts and additionally acknowledges the omnipresence of face in
both types of context (see section 3.1).
13 Since our goal was to set up experimental scenarios in which face-threat is imminent, it
might seemas if this is no different from impoliteness. However, note that in impoliteness,
the face-threat is linguistically actualized (the offence does not remain virtual), while in
our scenarios it is merely expected (see section 3.1). This is because, unlike the linguistic
(politeness) strategies discussed by Brown & Levinson, the language used in our stimuli
is “neutral” with respect to face-threat and -boost (it does not encode either, as Bonnefon
and colleagues’ stimuli are claimed to do). This in turn allows us to observe how face con-
cerns influence the interpretation of languagewithout assuming anything aboutwhat the
language (the predicate used) itself does in these circumstances.
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3.4 Residual considerations
The fact that face-threat is best construed as a matter of situational context
(section 3.1) highlights the importance of a few other situational factors, start-
ing with participant gender. The nexus of im/politeness and gender has been
primarily studied by sociolinguists (for a recent overview, see Chalupnik et
al., 2017; for a recent experimental study using ERPs, see Jiang & Zhou 2015:
257–259), who found that women tend to use more indirect strategies overall,
one explanation for which is that they tend to construe the same acts as more
face-threatening than men do.14 The fact that samples were not balanced for
gender in any of the previous experiments (women outnumbered men by as
much as 4.5 to 1 in Bonnefon et al., 2009; Feeney & Bonnefon, 2012; Holtgraves,
2014; Holtgraves & Perdew, 2016; men outnumbered women in Mazzarella et
al., 2018) could be yielding a somewhat biased picture in this regard. To alle-
viate this concern, a gender-balanced sample was used in the study reported
below.
Two additional considerations ought to be kept inmind, althoughwe do not
address them in the present study. The first pertains to the type of speech act
performed by the utterance in which the scalar is embedded: (2) can be con-
strued as a compliment (or, alternatively, as proposed in 2.2 above, a gentle let-
down), (3) as a criticism (or as a warning). The type of speech act participants
took the speaker to be performing each time may have affected their interpre-
tation of the scalar above and beyond the face-boosting or face-threatening
orientation of the sentential context; or, this face-orientation itself may be
emanating not so much from the lexical semantics of the predicate, which
researchers controlled for, but from the type of speech act performed, forwhich
they did not control. In short, controlling for the type of speech act in which
scalars are embedded is necessary before any claims about how face affects
interpretations of scalar terms can be asserted.
The second consideration concerns the range of languages and scalar terms
tested. The initial claim that face-threatening contexts favour one-sided inter-
pretations was based on results from two closely related languages (English
and French)15 and three scales (⟨some, all⟩, ⟨or, and⟩, ⟨possibly, probably⟩).
Given the small number of languages and terms studied, as well as the lack of
direct correspondence between translational equivalents of quantifiers raised
14 Other explanations of course are possible, from women’s greater adherence to standard
language norms (Hudson, 1996: 195), of which polite language use can be considered one
(Watts, 2002), to their use of indirectness as ameans of social filtering and bonding (Mor-
gan, 1991).
15 One study (Pighin & Bonnefon, 2011, study 2) involved Italian pregnant women.
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in other studies (Pouscoulous et al., 2007; Banga et al., 2009), expanding the
range of languages and scalar terms tested is necessary. When Holtgraves &
Kraus (2018) expanded the range of terms to five, they found important differ-
ences between the three ‘logical’ terms (some, sometimes, probable) and the two
evaluative ones (like, good). As a first step towardmore comprehensive study of
the nexus of face and the interpretation of scalar terms, in this article, we take
up the task of testing with a gender-balanced sample and an expanded range
of terms, leaving the type of speech act performed and languages other than
English to future research.
4 The present study
The present study addresses the following research questions: (1) How are
scalar terms interpreted when embedded in face-threatening vs. face-boosting
contexts? (2) Do different scalar terms behave alike in this respect or is there
variation among them?
We adopt a definition of lexical scales according to which two expressions
form a scale if (a) they are equally lexicalized, and (b) they can be ranked
according to somemetric which orders alternate values as higher or lower and
is salient to both speaker and hearer. This definition retains the requirement
of lexicalization from previous studies (e.g., Horn, 1972), while relaxing the
requirement of strict entailment (along the lines of Hirschberg, 1991). In the
present study, the following lexical scales were tested: ⟨some, all⟩ in both Sub-
ject and in Object positions,16 ⟨or, and⟩, ⟨often, always⟩, ⟨possible, likely⟩, ⟨like,
love⟩, ⟨good, excellent⟩, ⟨unwell, sick⟩, ⟨misguided, illegal⟩, ⟨assertive, bossy⟩,
⟨misleading, lying⟩. These represent a wider range than previous studies of
scalars in face-boosting/-threatening contexts and include items from a vari-
ety of scales; the last four represent contextually set up scales identified from
press articles and online searches using the heuristic “A but not B”.
To minimise the possibility that results will be biased by the linguistic con-
text of the utterance in which a term is appearing, each term was tested using
four different utterances, for a total of 32 different utterances (for the full set
of stimuli, see Appendix I).17 We also included control stimuli, which were
16 We tested Some-subject and Some-object separately because previous research found dif-
ferences in their acquisition (Armon-Lotem, 2008: 153).
17 The exception here are the last four terms (unwell,misguided, assertive,misleading) which
were tested as a group, using one utterance per term. Although these are all taken from
Non-Entailment Scales, in the results below we discuss them separately given they vary
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missing fromprevious studies. For each utterance, two story versionswere con-
structed. These were intended to provide a face-boosting or face-threatening
context for the utterance through the story content. In other words, contrary
to the earlier research in which the context was kept stable and the utterances
alternated, and more along the lines of Holtgraves & Kraus (2018), we kept the
utterance stable and alternated the story versions in which it was embedded.
For example, one of the utterances for the adjective goodwas “You have a good
sense of rhythm.” This was alternately embedded in one of the story versions
below:
(7) Face boosting: Paul has his first guitar lesson with his new teacher. Paul
plays a portion of a song so the teacher can get a sense of his abilities. The
teacher, who is eager for new students, tells Paul, “You have a good sense
of rhythm.”
(8) Face threatening: Paul is playing guitar in a competition with a notori-
ously strict panel of judges. After Paul plays his song, the first judge is
silent for a while and then mutters, “You have a good sense of rhythm.”
In these examples, the implicature is that the proposition containing the
stronger alternative, ‘You have an excellent sense of rhythm’, is not true. If this
implicature is generated, then the speaker would be taken to mean that Paul
has a good but not excellent sense of rhythm.
4.1 Norming study
The norming study was designed to ensure that the story versions to be used
in the main study were perceived by participants as actually face-boosting
and face-threatening in the expected direction. As a reminder, we define ‘face-
boosting’ as genuinely enhancing the hearer’s positive face and ‘face-threat-
ening’ as potentially threatening the hearer’s positive face (see section 3.3). In
the norming study, participants saw one of the two versions of a story without
the final utterance containing the scalar term (“Youhave a good sense of rhythm”
in examples (7) and (8) above) in order to test the face orientation of the con-
text itself.
on some dimensions identified as important in recent work on adjectival scales (Benz et
al., 2018; Gotzner et al., 2018; Leffel et al., 2019).
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4.1.1 Participants
Sixty participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk took part in the
norming study. Only individuals with IP addresses from the US were allowed
to participate.
4.1.2 Materials
The 64 story versions (2 versions for each of 32 utterances) without the utter-
ance containing the scalar were counterbalanced and sorted across three lists
such that each participant saw only one version of each story. Each list con-
tained 21 or 22 story versions; 15 participants saw each list. The order of items
was randomized for every participant.
4.1.3 Procedure
After having read one of the story versions (e.g., either (7) or (8) in the exam-
ples above), participantswere asked to indicate ona five-point Likert scale, only
the end-points of whichwere labelled as 1 = “very unlikely” and 5 = “very likely”,
“How likely is it that S will say something nice to H?”18
4.1.4 Results
To ensure that our story versions were face-boosting/-threatening in the ex-
pected directions, mean ratings for Boost and Threat versions were required
to be higher or lower than three (the midpoint of the five-point scale used),
respectively. Eleven story versions in the initial set failed tomeet this criterion;
these were revised and presented to 15 new participants in a fourth list. After
revisions, all 64 story versions met the criterion. The average rating across all
Boost version stories was 4.37 (sd = 0.41); the average rating across all Threat
version stories was 2.07 (sd = 0.40). This norming study ensures that our con-
texts were indeed face-boosting and face-threatening in the expected direc-
tion.
18 In a few instances, the alternative question “How likely is it that S will say something that
H wants to hear?” was used if that was more suitable. Both of these questions manipulate
expectations of face-threat/boost rather than face-threat/boost itself. This is in line with
Brown & Levinson’s conceptualisation of face-threat in terms of ‘virtual offence’, since
linguistic strategies in their model are meant to ensure precisely that face-threat doesn’t
ultimatelymaterialise (section 2.3). In otherwords, it is enough for a situation to engender
expectations of face-threat to be characterized as face-threatening (andmutatismutandis
for face-boost).
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4.2 Main study
4.2.1 Participants
162 participants (F = 80, mean age = 35) were recruited from MTurk for the
main study. Participants who had taken part in the norming study were not
allowed toparticipate in themain study.Only participantswithUS IP addresses
were allowed to take part. Participantswere asked to report what language they
speak at home; 161 participants reported speaking English only and one partic-
ipant reported English and Italian.
4.2.2 Materials
The main study presented the story versions complete with the final utterance
containing the scalar, as in the examples in (7) and (8) above. The 64 story ver-
sionswere counterbalanced over four lists; each list contained 16 critical stories
and 7 filler stories for a total of 23 stories. Each participant saw a story in only
one of its versions (face-boosting or face-threatening). 40 or 41 participants saw
each list. The order of items was randomized for each participant.
4.2.3 Procedure
This time, participants were asked to judge on a five-point scale how likely it
is that the speaker means the stronger term in the scale. Again, only the end-
points of the scale were labelled, as “very unlikely” (=1) and “very likely” (=5). A
full example is given in (9) (good, face-threatening version):
(9) Paul is playing guitar in a competition with a notoriously strict panel of
judges. After Paul plays his song, the first judge is silent for a while and
then mutters, “You have a good sense of rhythm.”
How likely is it the judge means that Paul has an excellent
sense of rhythm?
1 2 3 4 5
Very unlikely Very likely
4.2.4 Results
With ordinal data like the type our experiment generates, rating data typically
are sparse between participants and items, and building a maximal random
effects model introduces either convergence problems or other issues with
the estimation of fixed effects. For this reason, we used Bayesian statistics to
analyse our results (Nicenboim&Vasishth, 2016; Kimball et al., 2018).While fre-
quentist approaches aim to address a null hypothesis that a difference between
conditions is 0, Bayesian approaches aim to estimate the size of the difference
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table 1 Model results for leave one out cross vali-
dation (LOO) information criterion (IC)
Model LOO IC SE
Model 1: Intercept Only 7120.50 65.04
Model 2: Condition 6912.89 67.94
Model 3: Scalar 6960.45 70.80
Model 4: Condition + Scalar 6663.98 75.03
Model 5: Condition * Scalar 6662.13 73.62
along with a degree of certainty about this estimate (the “credible interval”).
They are thus seen as providing a more fine-grained approach and are consid-
ered especially helpful in hierarchical mixed-effects models.
Following themethodology described in Bürkner andVuorre (2018) for ordi-
nal models and using the r package brms (Bürkner, 2017), fully Bayesian max-
imal random effects models were fit for the following five models: an inde-
pendence (null) model (Model 1: Intercept Only), one-factor models for Con-
dition Only (Model 2) and Scalar Only (Model 3), a two-factor model (Condi-
tion+Scalar, Model 4) and a two-factor model with an interaction term (Con-
dition * Scalar, Model 5). The independence model assumes that there are no
relationships between items, thus providing a baseline fromwhich to compare
the relative fit of all the other models. One-factor models assume that all items
constitute one underlying construct. These models were used to test the rival
hypothesis that one factor (Conditionor Scalar) provides thebest fit to thedata.
The two-factor and two-factor-with interactionmodels test the hypothesis that
the items measure two distinct, potentially interacting, constructs. The leave
one out cross validation information criterion (LOO IC) gives a comparative
measure of model fit and is described in Vehtari, Gelman and Gabry (2017).
This method arrives at an Information Criterion value by iteratively training a
function based on all but one data point and validating on the excluded point.
A comparatively lower LOO IC value indicates that one model captures more
information of the data than another. The standard error of each LOO IC gives
us a measure of how much noise there is in the data; in comparing two mod-
els, if the standard error is larger than the difference in LOO IC, the data lack
the information to distinguish between the two models. The results are given
in Table 1.
For our purposes there are five models under consideration with the two
possible fixed effects, Condition (C) and Scalar (S). Table 2 represents the dif-
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table 2 Leave one out cross validation comparison for Models 1–5
Model comparison Difference in LOO IC SE Difference/SE
IO vs C+S 456.53 49.38 9.25
IO vs C 207.61 32.64 6.36
IO vs S 160.05 35.02 4.56
C+S vs C*S 1.85 7.30 .25
S vs C + S 296.47 42.02 7.05
C vs C + S 248.91 38.90 6.39
ferences in LOO between these models, with standard errors. In the Intercept
Only (Model 1) versus Condition + Scalar (Model 4) comparison, the positive
difference indicates the firstmodel is less informative than the secondmodel—
that is, the model with no variables is less informative than the model with
Condition and Scalar as fixed effects. The standard error, 49.38, is several times
smaller than the difference, 456.53, indicating that the C+S model (Model 4)
reliably captures more information than the Intercept Only model (Model 1).
Comparing the C+S (Model 4) and C*S (Model 5) models, the difference is 1.85,
but the standard error is 7.30, meaning there is no evidence that these mod-
els are informationally distinct and, therefore, no evidence that the interaction
term should be included. Based on these comparisons, the C+Smodel, without
the interaction term, is the optimal model and will be used for analysis.
Table 3 presents estimates for each parameter of the selected Condition +
Scalar model (two parameters for Condition, Threat vs. Boost, and 11 parame-
ters for Scalar).19 The logit linkedwas used, so estimates greater than 0 indicate
that a higher rating (a one-sided interpretation of the scalar) is more likely
compared to the reference category (‘Boost’ for Condition and ‘possible’ for
Scalar). Bayesian models do not produce a direct analogue to p-values in fre-
quentist models, but the 95% credible intervals, with a 2.5% Lower Credible
Interval (LCI) and 97.5%UpperCredible Interval (UCI), for each parameter can
be tested to see if there is overlap with 0 (i.e. no difference). If the intervals do
not overlap with zero, that means that a null effect is not within 95% of cred-
ibility; if the intervals do overlap with zero, then a null effect is within 95% of
credibility. The greyed cells in Table 3 indicate parameters for which the 95%
19 For the purposes of statistical analysis, we analysed the four non-entailment scales sepa-
rately in order for each parameter to correspond to a different lexical item.
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table 3 Parameter estimates and credible intervals from C+S model
Variable Estimate Est error 2.5% LCI 97.5% UCI
ConditionThreat –0.5 0.4 –1.3 0.3
ScalarGood –0.5 0.6 –1.6 0.6
ScalarLike –0.6 0.6 –1.7 0.6
ScalarNES1—unwell 3.3 1.1 1.2 5.6
ScalarNES2—misguided –1.5 1.1 –3.6 0.6
ScalarNES3—assertive 1.3 1 –0.7 3.4
ScalarNES4—misleading 1 0.9 –0.8 2.7
ScalarOften –0.7 0.6 –1.8 0.5
ScalarOr –3.9 0.7 –5.3 –2.6
ScalarSomeO –3.8 0.6 –5 –2.6
ScalarSomeS –4.2 0.6 –5.5 –3
credible intervals do not overlap with zero. As Table 3 shows, or, some-object,
some-subject and the non-entailment scalar unwell yield non-null effects in the
data given the model.
In Figures 1 and 2 below, the 95% credible intervals are plotted from the C+S
model for Condition and Scalar, respectively. The y-axis represents the model-
estimated probability of each rating (1= two-sided interpretation is most likely;
5 = one-sided interpretation is most likely) where the circle is the estimate and
the bars indicate the 95% credible intervals. While Figure 1 shows that there
is not sufficient evidence for a consistent overall effect of Condition, Figure 2
shows that three of the scalar terms—or, some-object, and some-subject—had
a credible tendency for lower ratings, and one of the non-entailment scales
(⟨unwell, sick⟩) had a credible tendency for higher ratings.
5 Discussion
To investigate the effect of situational context on the interpretation of scalar
terms, we manipulated the face-boosting/-threatening orientation of the con-
text and obtained participant judgements regarding the likelihood that differ-
ent scalar terms would be interpreted in a one-sided way (including a stronger
alternative, i.e. without a SI). For twoof these (or, and some), we found that they
tend to induce two-sided readings in all contexts (our prediction that somemay
behave differently in subject and object positions was not confirmed). These
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figure 1 C+S model estimates for condition and 95% credible interval
figure 2 C+S model estimates for scalar plus 95% credible interval
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results are in line with those of studies on scalar diversity (section 2.1). These
terms seem to generally induce scalar implicatures irrespective of situational
context and are less prone to contextual enrichment. However, wewere unable
to replicate the finding of earlier studies that investigated these terms in face-
boosting vs. face-threatening contexts that face-threatening contexts lead to
one-sided interpretations (section 2.2). Nor were we able to establish such an
effect for the remaining terms. Moreover, for these terms (with the exception
of unwell),20 our results do not allow establishing a preference for one-sided vs.
two-sided readings, suggesting that their nonce context of occurrence plays a
major role in their interpretation.
When comparing these results with those of previous studies on scalar
diversity and on the effect of face-threat/-boost on scalar interpretation, it is
important to highlight how our experimental setup was different. The stud-
ies on which the original claim that face-threatening contexts warrant one-
sided readings of scalars was based investigated terms that generally tend to
induce SIs (some, or) in one situational context per term and determined
face-orientation (boost vs. threat) based on the lexical semantics of the pred-
icate in whose scope the scalar appeared. This homogeneity in their mate-
rials may have inadvertently resulted in the consistency in scalar interpreta-
tions that they found, effectively showing how the specific scalar terms inves-
tigated behave in the scope of positively- vs. negatively-valenced predicates
rather than how scalar terms more generally are interpreted in face-boosting
vs. face-threatening contexts. On the contrary, we investigated each term in
four different sentential contexts, each of which was alternately embedded in
two different story versions. Story versions differed in face-orientation under-
stood as produced in context (for which we controlled by means of norming)
but also in other ways (number and identity of interacting characters; type
of speech act performed; additional aspects of face threatened, cf. fn. 12), for
which we did not control.21 Could these additional differences between our
story versions be behind the inconclusiveness of our results with respect to
face-orientation?
Without denying that these further aspects affected our results, we believe
these differences are notwholly responsible for the absence of non-null effects.
If that were so, these differences should have equally affected all scalars. How-
20 Unwell showed a reliable tendency for one-sided interpretations (‘unwell and possibly
sick’). Since unwell was one of our Non-Entailment Scales terms that were tested in one
sentential context only, and given the register difference between the two scalemates, we
do not think this finding warrants generalisation without further testing.
21 A post-hoc classification of our story versions according to seven factors (speaker-ad-
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ever, given the robust results obtained for some and or, we believe that the vari-
able ratings obtained with the other terms are a genuine reflection of scalar
diversity and, taking on board the notion of UBELE from Sun et al. (2018),
further hypothesise that, compared with some and or which are subject to
local enrichment, the remaining terms we tested are more likely to be globally
enriched, calling for fully-fledged Gricean reasoning that can variably produce
one-sided or two-sided readings depending on the interlocutors’ goals in the
specific context of utterance. If this hypothesis is correct, it would explain at
least some of the story variance in our results.
Given the multiple contextual parameters that can affect assessments of
face-boost/-threat and the fact that such assessments are ultimately subjective
to a degree, studies manipulating these notions are bound to be less controlled
than experimental pragmatic studies manipulating other parameters affecting
interpretation. Yet, we believe experimentation in this field is possible (indeed,
necessary!), if only because the underlying face dynamics—despite being ever-
present—is all too often ignored. In the rest of this section, we highlight two
methodological aspects of our study that follow from our theoretical commit-
ment to the notions of face and face-threat/-boost as understood in the current
im/politeness literature and that we believe future studies experimenting with
im/politeness should bear inmind.Given the subjectivity in face-related judge-
ments, future studies are also likely to benefit from eliciting demographic and
other (e.g., attitudes) information about the participants themselves, to test the
possibility that different types of participants interpret different scalar terms
differently.
5.1 The complex interface between face and affect
Aspointedout in section 3.2, face-boosting is not apossible option in theBrown
Levinsonian framework. Given this, it is unclear how “face-boosting” should be
understood when applied to examples such as “Some people loved your poem”
(from Bonnefon et al., 2009).22 To avoid problems with determining what is
dressee pair; one-to-one vs. multi-party interaction; length in words; illocutionary force;
interlocutor familiarity; leisure vs. work; private vs. professional) showed that, as regards
the two versions of each story, these factorswere stable half the time (16/32 stories). Of the
remaining 16 stories, 10 were characterized by a change in speaker-hearer pair, which in 3
cases was also a change between multi-party and dyadic conversation. In terms of length
in words (range: 16–71, mean 45), the two conditions were more than ten words apart in
2 cases; while another 4 stories were characterized by a difference in illocutionary force
between the two conditions.
22 The extremely low ratings for Kindness obtained for face-boosting contexts in their third
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face-boosting in our own study, we opted for a construal of face which makes
it possible to actively enhance positive face, in line with subsequent research
on this topic (Bayraktaroğlu, 1991; Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1997; Hernandez Flores,
1999; Leech, 2014). Our phrasing of the question used in the norming study
(“How likely is it that S will say something nice toH?”) is indicative of this. “Say-
ing something nice” amounts to showing approval, admiration, solidarity, or
inclusion—all notions relating to positive face as defined by Brown and Levin-
son (1987: 61).
We opted for this phrasing for a couple of reasons. First, we wanted to
avoid asking participants directly about ‘face,’ as the technical understanding
of this term in the im/politeness literature and as a lay term can be different
(O’Driscoll, 1996: 8; Terkourafi, 2007: 318–325). Second, this phrasing highlights
another aspect of face, namely, its link with affect. Both Goffman (1967: 23) and
Brown & Levinson (1987: 28) acknowledged that face has an inextricable affec-
tive aspect—suffice it to think how face loss can both result from, and cause,
negative affect (e.g., anger). In connection with this, note that affective consid-
erations are not absent from the earlier experiments either. To interpret “Some
people hated your poem” ((3) above from Bonnefon et al., 2009) as one-sided,
the hearer must presume that the speaker is positively predisposed toward
them. The introduction of the target utterance by the phrase “one fellowmem-
ber confides to you that” in their experiment, with the intimacy signalled by
the predicate “confides,” could have facilitated this presumption. If, on the con-
trary, a negatively affective stance were attributed to the speaker (say, because
the speaker is a competitor or known to relish in giving badnews), the speaker’s
assertion of the existence of people who hated your poemwould not necessar-
ily give rise to theone-sided interpretation.This couldbe the result of epistemic
vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010), implemented through trust in the speaker and
in the plausibility of the information in Mazzarella et al.’s (2018) experiments.
With a speaker whosemotives we find questionable, epistemic vigilance could
lead us to accept the implicature (the two-sided reading) rather than reject it.
In other words, default attributions of affect motivated by the language used
in their vignettes may have inadvertently influenced the derivation (or not) of
the SI in the earlier experiments.23
experiment (Bonnefon et al., 2009: 254) could be taken as evidence of participants’ per-
plexity in this regard.
23 Drawing a link between politeness and affect, in a study of modus ponens (a non-scalar
phenomenon), Demeure et al. (2009) manipulated dis/liking between interlocutors and
found that “for the sake of politeness, people use ambiguous statements to correct lis-
teners who dislike them” (2009: 264). Brown & Levinson see such ‘affective distance’ or
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The larger P300 responses to the one-sided continuation obtained by Holt-
graves & Kraus (2018), with additional larger P200 responses for the positively
valenced terms (good and like) in face-threatening contexts, further suggest
that the effects of face-threat are discernible on the emotional/affective plane.
While face is not affect per se, the (expected/ projected) impact of a situation
on the listener’s emotions is oneway of making tractable this otherwise elusive
notion. Given this close link between face and affect, asking about the expected
impact on the listener’s feelings of what might be said next offers a tangible
way of determining the face orientation of the context (face-boosting vs. face-
threatening) without asking about face directly.
That said, it is important to stress that face is not affect per se. Rather, as a
mix of self-presentational concerns (our concern for our image in the eyes of
others), it is a complex outcome of sociological variables instantiated in the sit-
uation. Itwould thereforebe inappropriate tomanipulate face-threat/-boost by
manipulating affect alone (e.g., by consistently changing a smile to a frown in
our story versions to suggest a different emotional state of the speaker). Rather,
holistically manipulating the situation is what is required to properly manipu-
late face-threat/-boost, according to Brown&Levinson’s framework.While this
mayhave introduced added complexity to our stimuli, thismove is necessary to
ensure that what is manipulated is face-threat/-boost and not (just) affect. Our
methodological choice to conceptualise face orientation as emergent from the
situational context and ascertain its direction throughnorming further guaran-
tees amodicumof consensus that our face-boosting story versionswere indeed
those in which enhancement of the listener’s positive face was expected, and
mutatis mutandis for the face-threatening ones.
5.2 The importance of speakermeaning
OnGrice’s definitionof implicature, implicatures are amatter of speakermean-
ing and are generated by virtue of the speaker’s intention to convey their
contents—or, in the case of Generalized Conversational Implicatures (Grice,
1989: 37), her doing nothing to prevent this. An important point often missed
in this connection is whether the speaker actually believes the implicature to
be true. This is especially relevant in the case of politeness implicatures: it is
the speaker’s intention to have the listener believe that ‘Some but not all people
hated your poem’ that makes (3) a polite utterance, not whether the speaker
actually believes this implicature herself. The listener who is grateful to her for
‘liking’ as potentially another sociological variable to be added, alongside P, D and R, to
their formula estimating the risk of face-threat (1987: 16), rather than as an ingredient of
face itself.
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softening the blow is grateful not because he takes her to believe that not all
people hated his poem but for her considerateness in putting it that way.
Previous research on scalars utilized an inference task asking participants
to indicate the likelihood that the stronger term is true, given the speaker’s
utterance (see (4) above). Both the inference task (Van Tiel et al., 2016) and
the verification task also common in SI research (Doran et al., 2009) focus
on whether the implicature is true.24 Unlike this research and closer to the
approach taken by Mazzarella et al. (2018), we asked participants whether the
speaker could have meant the stronger term (see (9) above). Focusing on the
speaker’s intention means that it is not enough for the inference to be avail-
able in the context. What we wanted to know was whether the SI was some-
thing that participants thought was meant to be recognized by the listener as
speaker-intended. Given Brown and Levinson’s explicit adoption of a Gricean
framework, in which politeness is precisely supposed to be a matter of inten-
tion (1987: 5),25webelieve this is amore appropriatewayof finding outwhether
politeness is a motivating factor for the implicature in these cases.26
6 Concluding thoughts
The possibility that euphemism (a type of politeness) can be relevant to scalar
interpretations has been suggested in the context of negative strengthening
(Horn, 1992), andmore recent work, while focusing on the importance of scale
structure, does not reject this possibility (cf. Leffel et al., 2019: 5). Indeed, the
lexical semantics of terms used in our study may be part of the reason for the
inconclusive results with terms other than some and or. While our results do
not support those of earlier research regarding the direction of inference in
face-boosting vs. -threatening contexts, they confirm research on scalar diver-
sity, which has shown that hearers draw SIs less with semantically rich and
24 The questions asked by Doran et al. (2009) and Van Tiel et al. (2016), respectively, were:
“Is the speaker’s statement true or false?” and “Would you conclude that, according to the
speaker, the stronger term is true?”.
25 This assumption has been challenged by subsequent research (Arundale, 1999; Terkourafi,
2001, 2003, 2008; Haugh, 2003).
26 Bonnefon et al.’s (2009) third experiment actually aimed to test whether listeners attri-
buted a polite intention to a speaker who used “some” when in fact ‘all’ was true. However,
in that experiment, participants were told a priori whether ‘all’ or ‘not all’ was true. That
is, they were not given the option of deriving the SI (or not) depending on whether they
attributed a polite intention to the speaker (or not). As such, this experiment does not
establish a direct link between the speaker’s polite intention and the derivation of the SI.
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with vague terms. They thus add to this expanding literature from a different
perspective, that of situational context.
Looking ahead, it is possible that, for terms that call for global enrichment,
the direction of enrichment may also differ in each situational context, even
if these contexts share the same face-orientation. Moreover, the finding that
not all scalars are equally sensitive to face concerns raises the possibility that
scalars that are more “open to interpretation” do more “politeness work” than
those that are not and are therefore more likely to be used to this effect by
speakers and interpreted in this light by hearers. Future work in this vein could
help us explainwhich linguistic expressions carry the brunt of doing politeness
work, how, and why.
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Appendix I—Main study stimuli
⟨some, all⟩—Subject 1
Face boosting: John is a contestant in a local poetry competition. On the big
night, he gets up on stage and reads his poem.When he returns to his seat, his
girlfriend Mary smiles and tells him: “Some people loved your poem.”
Face threatening: John has submitted a poem to a venerated poetry club hoping
to become a member. This is John’s third attempt to join the club, and he is in
a fierce competition with George for the chance to join.While they are waiting
to hear the results, George goes up to John and tells him: “Some people loved
your poem.”
⟨some, all⟩—Subject 2
Face boosting: Nicole is at gymnastics practice and performs her new routine
in front of her parents for the first time. After the routine, she goes over to her
parents and her mom tells her, “Some parts were perfect.”
Face threatening: Nicole is at gymnastics practice and performs her new rou-
tine in its entirety for the first time in front of her tough and demanding coach.
After the routine, she goes over to her coach, who tells her, “Some parts were
perfect.”
⟨some, all⟩—Subject 3
Face boosting: Margaret and William are dropping their daughter off at her
first dance practice. They are greeted warmly by the instructor, and are very
impressed by howwelcoming she is. At the end of their short conversationwith
her, the instructor tells them: “Some parents stay to watch the rehearsal.”
Face threatening:Margaret andWilliam are dropping their daughter off at her
first dance practice. As practice starts, they are hovering around the side of
the room, watching the rehearsal. The instructor feels uncomfortable and their
presence is bothering her, so she comes over to talk to them. She says: “Some
parents stay to watch the rehearsal.”
⟨some, all⟩—Subject 4
Face boosting: Patrick, has spent all day in the kitchen preparing a Thanks-
giving feast with many dishes. After the feast, his loving wife who has always
encouraged him to get more involved in the kitchen tells him: “Some dishes
were wonderful.”
Face threatening:Patrick has spent all day in the kitchenpreparing aThanksgiv-
ing feast with many dishes. After the feast, his tough-to-please mother-in-law
remarks to him: “Some dishes were wonderful.”
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⟨some, all⟩—Object 1
Face boosting: Barbara’s two sons have been entertaining themselves all day,
playing safely and happily outside while allowing Barbara to complete her
work. She wants to reward them for being good boys, so she puts out a plate
of cookies and calls them inside. She says to them, “You can have some cook-
ies.”
Face threatening: Barbara’s two sons have been a nuisance all day, continuously
bothering her and asking her for cookies while she is trying to complete her
work. Frustrated, she finally gives in and opens the box, saying to them, “You
can have some cookies.”
⟨some, all⟩—Object 2
Face boosting: Kevin and his professor have been doing some exciting research
and are now looking at a list of conferences where Kevin can travel and present
their work. His professor tells him, “Looks like you’ll go to some conferences.”
Face threatening: Kevin has been begging his professor to let him travel to con-
ferences to present his work, but his professor is a bit hesitant. Kevin shows
his professor a list of conferences, to which his professor responds, “Looks like
you’ll go to some conferences.”
⟨some, all⟩—Object 3
Face boosting: Oliver and his mother are walking down the street when they
see a store with a sign in the window that says “Free Books!” They head in
and are greeted by the store owner, who shows Oliver a row of children’s
books. Oliver shyly proceeds to the row and looks through the books with his
mother. The store owner walks over to them and says, “Feel free to take some
books.”
Face threatening:Ron is an avid reader of second-hand books. One day hewalks
past a new second-handbookstore and sees a sign in thewindow that says “Free
Books!” He reaches into his backpack and pulls out a large grocery bag, then
enters the store and starts loading books into it. The store owner goes up to
him and says, “Feel free to take some books.”
⟨some, all⟩—Object 4
Face boosting: Jennifer, a Democrat, is chatting with her Democrat friends. She
says: “I disagree with some Republicans.”
Face threatening: Jennifer, a Democrat, is arguing with her Republican friends.
She says: “I disagree with some Republicans.”
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⟨or, and⟩ 1
Face boosting: Nick and Amanda went on a date last week and both had a
great time. Nick eagerly asks Amanda when they can hang out again and she
responds, “Wednesday or Thursday.”
Face threatening: Nick has been pressuring Amanda to go on a date with him
for weeks. She decides, begrudgingly, to give him a chance. Nick eagerly asks
her when they can go out and she much-less-eagerly responds, “Wednesday or
Thursday.”
⟨or, and⟩ 2
Face boosting: Susan brings her 8-year-old son, Ben, to the bank because the
nice teller always offers Ben candy. The teller sees Ben eagerly approaching the
counter and says to him, “You can have Skittles or Starbursts.”
Face threatening: Susan brings her annoying 8-year-old son, Ben, to the bank
because the bank tellers usually have candy to hand out. The cranky old teller,
annoyed at Ben’s over-enthusiasm to get candy, tells him “You can have Skittles
or Starbursts.”
⟨or, and⟩ 3
Face boosting:Mark is helping his friend Greg move a bunch of boxes in Greg’s
garage. They head into the house for a break, andGreg offersMark a cold drink.
Mark asks Greg what he has, and Greg responds, “There’s water or beer.”
Face threatening: Mark is helping his friend Greg move a bunch of boxes in
Greg’s garage. Mark keeps complaining about being hot and tired, and Greg
is frustrated and just wants to hurry the process. Greg eventually tries to shut
Mark up and says: “There’s water or beer.”
⟨or, and⟩ 4
Face boosting:Quincy, the beloved superstar athlete on the track team, is chat-
ting with his coach after practice and asks him what he’ll be participating in in
the upcomingmeet. His coach responds, “You’ll be doing high jumpor hurdles.”
Face threatening:Quincy, one of the worst athletes on the track team, is annoy-
ing his coach by askingwhat he’ll be participating in in the upcomingmeet. His
coach responds, “You’ll be doing high jump or hurdles.”
⟨often, always⟩ 1
Face boosting:Thomas is thanking his therapist at the end of a session. Thomas
has been feeling much better recently, and thinks the therapy is going really
well. He tells his therapist: “Your suggestions are often helpful.”
Face threatening:Thomas is going to fire his therapist at the end of this session.
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Thomas doesn’t get along with the therapist on a personal level, which he feels
impacts his ability to make progress. He tells his therapist: “Your suggestions
are often helpful.”
⟨often, always⟩ 2
Faceboosting: Derek andPeter havebeenbest friends since kindergarten.Derek
has been hoping to ask Courtney out on a date for a while, but has noticed
recently that she spends a lot of time with Chris. Derek asks Peter, who he
always goes to for support, if he knows anything about Courtney’s relationship
status. Peter responds: “I don’t know, but they’re often together.”
Face threatening: Derek has been hoping to ask Courtney out on a date for a
while, but has noticed recently that she spends a lot of time with Chris. Derek
asks Courtney’s best friend, who knows Courtney doesn’t like Derek, about
Courtney’s relationship status with Chris. Her friend responds: “I don’t know,
but they’re often together.”
⟨often, always⟩ 3
Face boosting: Simon just moved to a new city for work. He doesn’t have any
friends in the area, but his co-workers have been very welcoming and nice to
him. Simon asks one of these co-workers, Jacob, what he’s doing for Thanks-
giving, which is coming up soon. Jacob responds, “I often host a Thanksgiving
dinner for my friends.”
Face threatening: Simon just moved to a new city for work. He doesn’t have
any friends in the area, but he tries to be friendly to his new co-workers.
Unfortunately, his new co-workers, especially Jacob, find him annoying. Simon
asks Jacob what he’s doing for Thanksgiving, which is coming up soon. Jacob
responds, “I often host a Thanksgiving dinner for my friends.”
⟨often, always⟩ 4
Face boosting: Joanne is the executive chef in a prestigious restaurant. She just
hired Trent to work in the kitchen. Paige has been working there for a year, so
she is tasked with training Trent. She is very friendly and helpful while training
him, and the working environment is very comfortable. Paige notes, “Joanne is
often pleased when the plate presentation is perfect.”
Face threatening: Joanne is the executive chef in a prestigious restaurant. She
just hired Trent to work in the kitchen. Paige has been working there for a year,
so she is tasked with training Trent. She is clearly stressed out from working
under the strict guidance of Joanne, and is not very friendly or helpful while
training Trent. Paige notes, “Joanne is often pleased when the plate presenta-
tion is perfect.”
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⟨possible, likely⟩ 1
Face boosting: Michael is talking to his girlfriend, who lives in Chicago, about
where he may wind up getting placed for his new job. He’s going over the
options and enthusiastically concludes: “It’s possible that I’ll end up in Chi-
cago.”
Face threatening: Michael is talking to his girlfriend, who lives in Los Angeles,
about where he may wind up getting placed for his new job. She keeps asking
him to goover the options andhe concludes, somewhat frustrated, “It’s possible
that I’ll end up in Chicago.”
⟨possible, likely⟩ 2
Face boosting: Riley is hoping to buy a new car and has been saving up her
money for a while. Her parents are rich, but she usually doesn’t like to rely on
them for financial help. When she decides to ask for their support, her mother
responds: “It’s possible we could help you out.”
Face threatening: Riley is hoping to buy a new car but hasn’t been responsible
with her money. She’s asked her parents for several loans, but never seems to
save up any money towards the car. When she goes to ask them for a loan for
the 5th time, her mother responds: “It’s possible we could help you out.”
⟨possible, likely⟩ 3
Face boosting: Victor’s car is in the shop for the afternoon, so he asks his room-
mate, Reggie, who just bought a new car and is excited to drive it at all times, if
he could get a ride home from work later. Reggie responds, “It’s possible that’ll
work, it depends on the timing.”
Face threatening: Victor sold his car and has been repeatedly asking his room-
mates if they’d pick him up at work and give him a ride home. Today, he asks
his roommateReggie, who’s getting frustratedwith the situation, for a ride back
in the afternoon. Reggie responds, “It’s possible that’ll work, it depends on the
timing.”
⟨possible, likely⟩ 4
Face boosting: Alex and his best friend Marco are out at a bar, and Alex spends
a lot of the night chatting with a girl. At the end of the night, they exchange
numbers, and Alex is telling Marco about it on the way home. Alex asks Marco
if he thinks she’ll ever text him, to which Marco responds, “It’s possible.”
Face threatening:Alex is over atMarco’s house for a barbecue. Marco can’t help
but be bothered that Alex spends most of the time hitting on Marco’s sister.
Alex gives her his number at the end of the night, and later asks Marco if he
thinks she’ll ever text him. Marco responds, “It’s possible.”
Downloaded from Brill.com03/19/2020 08:09:11AM
via free access
different scalar terms are affected by face differently 41
International Review of Pragmatics 12 (2020) 1–43
⟨like, love⟩ 1
Face boosting:Henrietta andBrandon are brainstormingwhere to go for dinner.
Henrietta suggests her favourite Indian food restaurant, and Brandon enthusi-
astically responds, “Sure, I like Indian food.”
Face threatening: Henrietta and Brandon are arguing yet again about where to
go for dinner.Henrietta suggests her favourite Indian food restaurant, andBran-
don, tired of all the arguing, responds, “Sure, I like Indian food.”
⟨like, love⟩ 2
Face boosting: Natalie is getting ready for a night out. She shows the clothes
she’s thinking about wearing to Sofia, her friendly and supporting roommate,
who tells Natalie, “I like your outfit.”
Face threatening: Natalie is getting ready for a night out. She shows the clothes
she’s thinking about wearing to Sofia, her harsh and critical roommate, who
tells Natalie, “I like your outfit.”
⟨like, love⟩ 3
Face boosting: Mara is showing some of her paintings at an art exhibition in
hopes of selling them. She notices her favourite uncle standing in front of one
particular painting for a while, so she walks up to him and asks him what he
thinks. He responds, “I like this painting.”
Face threatening: Mara is showing some of her paintings at an art exhibition
in hopes of selling them. She notices a famous art critic in attendance, walk-
ing around and shaking his head in disapproval. While he’s paused in front of
one particular painting, she walks over to him and asks himwhat he thinks. He
responds, “I like this painting.”
⟨like, love⟩ 4
Face boosting: Emily wants to ask Brett out on a date. Brett’s best friend, Adam,
knows that Brett would happily say yes if Emily asked him. Emily consults
Adam about the situation, and asks if Brett would like going to the movies.
Adam tells her: “Yeah, Brett likes going to the movies.”
Face threatening: Emily wants to ask Brett out on a date. Brett’s best friend,
Adam, knows that Brett would be horrified at the proposition and would not
want to go out with Emily. Emily consults Adam, and asks if Brett would like
going to the movies. Adam tells her: “Yeah, Brett likes going to the movies.”
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⟨good, excellent⟩ 1
Face boosting: David has been hoping for and expecting a promotion at work
recently. David’s boss calls him into the office, smiles, and says, “You are a good
employee.”
Face threatening: David’s company has been going through some rough times
financially and thus has had to make several layoffs around the office. David is
one of the least productive employees at the company, and doesn’t have a good
relationship with the boss. David’s boss calls him into the office and says, “You
are a good employee.”
⟨good, excellent⟩ 2
Face boosting: Lucy and her boss, Karen, are in a meeting to discuss Lucy’s
recent idea to try and save the companymoney. Karen, who likes Lucy and has
been talking to the CEO about promoting her, responds to Lucy’s suggestion:
“You’re presenting a good idea.”
Face threatening: Lucy and her boss, Karen, are in a meeting to discuss Lucy’s
recent idea to try and save the company money. Karen, who was very close to
firing Lucy just last month and still doesn’t trust her to handle the responsibil-
ities of the job, responds to Lucy’s suggestion: “You’re presenting a good idea.”
⟨good, excellent⟩ 3
Face boosting: Robin goes to meet with Professor Wilson, her favorite profes-
sor, in hopes of getting her to write a letter of recommendation. They get along
extremely well, and ProfessorWilson has told Robin that she’d love to write her
a letter. Professor Wilson responds to Robin’s request: “I’ll be sure to write you
a good recommendation.”
Face threatening: Robin goes to meet with Professor Wilson in hopes of get-
ting her to write a letter of recommendation. They don’t get along very well at
all, but Robin is out of options and desperately needs a letter from someone.
Professor Wilson responds to Robin’s request: “I’ll be sure to write you a good
recommendation.”
⟨good, excellent⟩ 4
Face boosting: Paul has his first guitar lesson with his new teacher. Paul plays
a portion of a song so the teacher can get a sense of his abilities. The teacher,
who is eager for new students, tells Paul, “You have a good sense of rhythm.”
Face threatening:Paul is playing guitar in a competitionwith anotoriously strict
panel of judges. After Paul plays his song, the first judge is silent for a while and
then mutters, “You have a good sense of rhythm.”
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Non-entailment scales 1 ⟨unwell, sick⟩
Face boosting: Julian knows that his friends usually go for drinks after class and
has been hoping they will ask him to join them. One day after class they finally
extend the invite tohim. Julian responds: “Sorry I can’t, I’ve been feelingunwell.”
Face threatening: Julian’s classmates want him to come out to a bar with them
after class, but Julian doesn’t like themand doesn’t want to gowith them.When
class is over, they extend the invite. Julian responds: “Sorry I can’t, I’ve been feel-
ing unwell.”
Non-entailment scales 2 ⟨misguided, illegal⟩
Face boosting: Cameron and Victoria are con artists, partners in crime. Victoria
is describing to Cameron her newest plot, which will involve swindling a top
government official out of a lot of money. Cameron responds: “Did you con-
sider your plan may be misguided?”
Face threatening: Cameron and Victoria are con artists who have been caught
by the police for attempting to swindle a top government official out of a lot
of money. At the opening of their trial, the judge asks them: “Did you consider
your plan may be misguided?”
Non-entailment scales 3 ⟨assertive, bossy⟩
Face-boosting: Sarah is telling her friendGina about an incident with a guywho
kept hitting on Sarah at a party andwouldn’t take no for an answer. Gina is con-
soling Sarah and responds: “In cases like this, it’s OK to be assertive.”
Face-threatening: Sarah and Gina have been working on a class project. Sarah
doesn’t feel like it’s been going very well, and Gina’s personality rubs her the
wrong way. She tells Gina this, and Gina responds: “In cases like this, it’s OK to
be assertive.”
Non-entailment scales 4 ⟨misleading, lying⟩
Face boosting:Natasha is a community organizer in her townand is often out on
the streets with her friend Nina gathering signatures for one cause or another.
Recently, she has been frustrated at how the local city officials treat the pub-
lic and is thinking of starting a petition to hold them accountable for their
behaviour. She tells Nina about it and she says “I can see why you think they
have been misleading you.”
Face threatening: Natasha is a community organizer in her town and is often
out on the streets gathering signatures for one cause or another. Some people,
like her neighbor, Louis, consider her a bit of a trouble-maker. Recently, she has
been frustrated at how the local city officials treat the public and is thinking of
starting a petition to hold them accountable for their behaviour. She tells Louis
about it and he says “I can see why you think they have been misleading you.”
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